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 Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.  My name 
is Lisa Heinzerling.  I am a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University 
Law Center.  I have also been a visiting professor at the Harvard and Yale 
Law Schools.  I am a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, 
where I served as editor-in-chief of the University of Chicago Law Review.  
After law school I clerked for Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and then for Justice William Brennan of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  I was an Assistant Attorney General in the 
Environmental Protection Division of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s 
Office for three years before coming to Georgetown in 1993.  My expertise 
is in environmental and administrative law.  I am also the Vice-President of 
the Center for Progressive Regulation. 
 
The Center for Progressive Regulation is a nonprofit research and 
educational organization of university-affiliated academics with expertise in 
the legal, economic, and scientific issues related to regulation of health, 
safety, and the environment. CPR supports regulatory action to                          
protect health, safety, and the environment, and rejects the conservative view 
that government’s only function is to increase the economic efficiency of 
private markets. Through research and commentary, CPR seeks to inform 
policy debates, critique anti-regulatory research, enhance public 
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understanding of the issues, and open the regulatory process to public 
scrutiny. 
 
My testimony today concerns the Office of Management and Budget’s 
Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations [hereinafter “Draft 2003 Report” or “Report”], 68 Fed. Reg. 
5492 (Feb. 3, 2003).  This draft report raises issues in four broad areas; 
briefly, the report: 
 
1) proposes new guidelines for cost-benefit analysis of federal 
regulation; 
 
2)  provides estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation 
for the period 1992-2002;  
 
3)  seeks guidance on improving cost-benefit analysis of regulations 
related to homeland security; and 
 
4)  invites commentators to discuss and critique current approaches to 
regulation of emerging risks.  
 
My specific conclusions about the Draft Report can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
1) OMB’s new proposed guidelines for cost-benefit analysis 
encourage agencies to skirt the laws under which they act; create 
onerous new analytical burdens for agencies, particularly agencies 
whose mission is to protect health, safety, and the environment; and 
further entrench economic methodologies that systematically 
undervalue health, safety, and environmental protection. 
 
2) The Draft 2003 Report’s estimates of the costs and benefits of 
federal regulation are unreliable, arbitrary, confusing, and highly 
skewed against regulations designed to protect health, safety, and the 
environment.   
 
3) OMB’s new solicitation of comments on cost-benefit analysis of 
homeland security serves as an example of OMB’s overweening 
ambitions for this methodology as a means of evaluating public 
policy. 
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4) OMB’s solicitation of comments on the regulatory system’s 
approach to emerging risks reflects OMB’s current bias against 
precautionary legislation that aims to prevent health, safety, and 
environmental problems before they cause harm. 
 
Far from using cost-benefit analysis as a neutral tool to evaluate public 
policy (which, as will be made clear below, it is not in any event capable of 
being), OMB instead uses cost-benefit analysis to attack regulations the 
administration does not like, and has so far declined to deploy cost-benefit 
analysis to evaluate policies (such as those reducing regulatory requirements 
and handing out agricultural subsidies) that the administration desires on 
other grounds.  This is not to say we think cost-benefit analysis should be 
used more often, but it is to say that using it in a politically biased fashion 
belies the objective purposes OMB has asserted in defending this type of 
analysis. Given the biases evident in OMB’s draft report, OMB’s ritualistic 
invocations of principles of “sound science” must be taken with a large grain 
of salt. 
 
I.  OMB’s Proposed Cost-Benefit Guidelines 
 
 OMB’s proposed guidelines for cost-benefit analysis are chock-full of 
new analytical requirements for regulatory agencies, requirements that can 
be expected to slow down the already-ossified rulemaking process and to 
impose significant new burdens on resource-starved agencies. More 
specifically, OMB’s proposed guidelines encourage agencies to skirt 
congressional directives in favor of following OMB’s cost-benefit agenda; 
they require a kind of analysis – cost-effectiveness analysis – for health and 
safety regulation that, when combined with discounting, produce biased and 
misleading results; they inappropriately require the quantification of 
uncertainty and eschew precautionary approaches to risk assessment; they 
further entrench OMB’s misguided efforts to translate human lives and 
health into monetary terms; and they also further entrench OMB’s 
trivialization of future harms through the technique of discounting. 
 
 In the proposed guidelines, OMB requires extensive analysis of 
regulatory alternatives, along with the alternatives’ comparative costs and 
benefits, by the administrative agencies. Even so, remarkably, OMB does 
not explain why or how its resource- and time-intensive new analytical 
requirements will achieve better regulatory results than the existing cost-
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benefit guidelines. OMB does not explain, in other words, why the 
“significant investments of agency staff and resources” (Draft 2003 Report, 
at 5498) required by its new guidelines are justified, except in the most 
conclusory terms. Nor does OMB explain why, throughout the cost-benefit 
guidelines, health, safety, and environmental regulation is singled out for 
special new analytical requirements, even though OMB’s own estimates of 
the costs and benefits of regulation would suggest that air pollution 
regulation, for example, is one of the best regulatory investments we have 
made. Why hobble a thoroughbred?  OMB does not explain. 
 
A. Dismissing Statutory Directives 
 
 OMB’s cost-benefit review of major agency rules will, even after its 
new cost-benefit guidance goes into effect, still take place under Executive 
Order No. 12866.  (Draft 2003 Report, at 5513.)  In its “Statement of 
Regulatory Philosophy and Principles,” Executive Order No. 12866 asserts:  
 
Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are 
required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are made 
necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of 
private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the 
public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people. . . . 
[I]n choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies 
should select those approaches that maximize net benefits (including 
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other 
advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires 
another regulatory approach.  (E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning and 
Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).) 
 
In the existing guidance on cost-benefit analysis of agency rules, OMB 
states that agency analysis should discuss whether the agency is addressing a 
market failure or other compelling public need. OMB then states: “If the 
proposed action is a result of a statutory or judicial directive, that should be 
so stated.”  (Executive Analysis of Federal Regulation Under Executive 
Order 12866 (January 11, 1996), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html.) 
 
 OMB’s proposed new guidance on cost-benefit analysis takes a quite 
different attitude to statutory directives.  No longer, it appears, is it enough if 
the statute under which an agency operates directs it to take action that might 
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be in tension with cost-benefit principles. Under the proposed guidance, 
agencies will be required to “demonstrate that the proposed action is 
necessary” because of a market failure or other compelling problem.  (Draft 
2003 Report, at 5514.)  Only after OMB tells agencies to identify the need 
for action does OMB admit that a statute might speak to the question at 
hand.  Even here, however, OMB seems anxious to preserve as much room 
for executive departure from congressional directives as possible: “If your 
regulatory intervention results from a statutory or judicial directive, you 
should describe the specific authority for your action, the extent of discretion 
available to you, and the regulatory instruments you might use.”  (Draft 
2003 Report, at 5514.)   
 
 Later in the Draft Report, OMB again invites agencies to do their best 
to skirt statutory directives when they conflict with OMB’s cost-benefit 
principles: “You should also discuss the statutory requirements that affect 
the selection of regulatory approaches.  If legal constraints prevent the 
selection of a regulatory action that best satisfies the philosophy and 
principles of Executive Order No. 12866, you should identify these 
constraints and estimate their opportunity cost.”  (Draft 2003 Report, at 
5518.)   
 
 Most federal laws do not require, and many do not even allow, 
agencies to use OMB-style cost-benefit analysis in developing regulatory 
policy. In its new guidelines for cost-benefit analysis, however, OMB 
appears to encourage, or even require, agencies to circumvent statutory 
directives when they conflict with OMB’s perspectives on regulatory policy. 
These guidelines thus effectively put OMB, rather than Congress, in charge 
of defining the scope of agency authority. This is not OMB’s role, either 
under federal statutes or under the federal Constitution. 
 
B. Requiring Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Health and Safety Rules 
 
 Another new feature of OMB’s proposed guidelines is the 
requirement that agencies issuing rules “for which the primary benefits are 
improved public health and safety” conduct cost-effectiveness analysis. 
(Draft 2003 Report, at 5516.)  That is, OMB proposes to require agencies to 
state the costs per unit of regulatory benefit produced. In the simplest case, 
this would mean that agencies protecting public health and safety would 
report the costs per life saved of their rules, in addition to conducting cost-
benefit analysis where possible. 
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 This new requirement is less benign than it might appear. There are 
two large problems with the kind of cost-effectiveness analysis OMB 
envisions. 
 
 First, although OMB states that “[c]ost-effectiveness analysis provides 
a rigorous way to identify options that achieve the most effective use of the 
resources available without requiring you to monetize all of the relevant 
benefits or costs” (Draft 2003 Report, at 5516), it is important to recognize 
that cost-effectiveness analysis, as practiced by OMB, nevertheless requires 
agencies to value human lives and health, even if not in monetary terms.  
This is so because OMB requires agencies to use discounting, a technique 
that results in a much lower value for lives saved in the future than for lives 
saved in the near term.  Moreover, surprisingly, the lack of monetization, 
when combined with OMB’s approach to discounting, can produce results 
even less favorable to health, safety, and environmental protection than cost-
benefit analysis, properly conducted, would. 
 
 This conclusion requires some explanation. OMB insists on 
discounting life-saving benefits that accrue in the future, such as the saving 
of lives from long-latency diseases like cancer, even for purposes of 
conducting cost-effectiveness analysis.  (Draft 2003 Report, at 5523.) In this 
setting, the lives saved, rather than the monetary value of the lives saved, are 
discounted.  Suppose EPA proposed a regulation that would save 100 people 
from a type of cancer that has a latency period of 20 years. OMB would 
require EPA to discount these 100 lives over 20 years before calculating the 
cost-effectiveness of this rule. Through the “magic” of discounting at 
OMB’s preferred discount rate of 7 percent, these 100 lives would be 
converted to 25.84 lives. In conducting cost-effectiveness analysis after 
discounting, EPA would divide the estimated costs of its rule by a number 
reflecting only about one-quarter of the actual lives saved by the rule, thus 
greatly enlarging the perceived costs per life saved of the rule. 
 
 This combination of cost-effectiveness analysis and discounting has a 
long and troubled history in regulatory circles.  Commonly circulated tables 
purporting to show that health and environmental protection costs hundreds 
of millions, or even billions, of dollars for every life saved use this 
methodological combination. Without discounting, the costs per life saved 
reflected in these tables drops by orders of magnitude. (See Lisa 
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Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 
(1998).)   
 
 Moreover, because in cost-effectiveness analysis regulatory benefits 
are presented as, say, human lives, rather than as dollars, discounting loses 
any theoretical foundation it might otherwise have.  Human lives cannot be 
put in the bank; they do not earn interest; they do not compound the way 
money does. It is inappropriate and deeply misleading to suggest that a rule 
saving 100 lives in 20 years from now, as in the example cited above, will 
actually save 25.84 lives. 
 
 Discounting benefits such as lives saved for purposes of cost-
effectiveness analysis undervalues such lives in another way as well. Where 
human lives are translated into monetary terms, it is appropriate to increase 
their monetary value over time due to expected increases in income, as there 
is good evidence that the willingness to pay for decreased risk increases with 
income. But such increases in value will not be reflected in cost-
effectiveness analysis, since no one has ever (to my knowledge) proposed 
compounding lives themselves to reflect income growth.  Thus, while future 
lives are discounted according to the prevailing rate of return on financial 
investment, as though they were money, future lives are not compounded to 
reflect income growth. Yet the logic of discounting depends on economic 
conditions that would themselves lead to growth in income. The failure to 
account for this fact in cost-effectiveness analysis understates the benefits of 
life-saving regulation. 
 
 A final problem created by cost-effectiveness analysis of health and 
safety regulation is the selection of the measure of effectiveness. In its 
official policy statements, OMB has appeared to embrace a preference for 
measuring the effectiveness of life-saving regulation according to the 
number of life-years saved by the regulation, rather than according to the 
number of lives saved. (OMB, Ranking Regulatory Investments in Public 
Health, Analytical Perspectives on FY 2003 Budget, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/spec24.pdf.) Tellingly, in its cost-
benefit practices as applied to individual policies, OMB appears to insist on 
assessing the wisdom of life-saving policies according to the number of life-
years they save. (Consider, again, the cost-benefit analysis of the “Clear 
Skies” initiative, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_adden.pdf, at pp. 35-37.)  In OMB’s 
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hands, rules that save the elderly become less cost-effective – and thus less 
justified – than rules that save younger people. 
 
C. Quantifying Uncertainty 
 
 Another significant innovation in OMB’s proposed guidelines is the 
requirement that agencies conduct a formal probabilistic analysis for rules 
with “economic effects that exceed more than $1 billion per year,” and also 
for other rules where possible. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5523.)  This 
requirement adds significantly to the analytical burdens of agencies charged 
with protecting health, safety, and the environment. 
 
 OMB’s new analytical requirement also incorporates OMB’s hostility 
to the precautionary principle which is embedded in many of our laws 
concerning health, safety, and the environment. OMB suggests, for example, 
that where uncertainty about regulatory consequences arises from a lack of 
data, an agency “might consider deferring the decision … pending further 
study to obtain sufficient data.” OMB also warns agencies that their analysis 
“should not reflect any unstated or unsupported preferences, even for such 
worthy objectives as protecting public health or the environment.”  (Draft 
2003 Report, at 5523.)  In these passages, OMB signals an intent to 
dismantle the precautionary approach that has been embraced by health, 
safety, and environmental agencies, based on their statutory mandates, for 
decades. 
 
D.  Translating Lives Into Dollars 
 
 In these proposed guidelines, OMB continues and deepens its 
misguided efforts to translate human lives into dollars.   
 
OMB adds numerous new analytical requirements for agencies that 
seek to “transfer” estimates of benefits from one setting to another.  (Draft 
2003 Report, at 5519-5520.) These requirements will add significantly to the 
already-existing analytical burdens of the agencies, without any explanation 
from OMB about why such requirements are necessary or about whether 
they respond to some specific problem OMB has encountered. These 
requirements also, in some cases, threaten to prevent agencies from using 
well-documented, peer-reviewed economic studies in their regulatory 
analyses.   
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For example, without elaboration, OMB forbids “benefits transfer” in 
some contexts, advising agencies that they “should not use a value 
developed from a study involving small marginal changes in a policy context 
involving large changes in the quantity of the good.”  (Draft 2003 Report, at 
5520.)  A careful student of OMB’s previous cost-benefit reports will recall 
that OMB has, in the past, severely criticized EPA’s retrospective analysis of 
the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act on precisely this ground. EPA’s 
peer-reviewed report concluded that clean air regulation had produced at 
least $22 trillion in net benefits from 1970-1990.  (EPA, The Benefits and 
Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990, at ES-8 (Oct. 1997).) This sunny 
conclusion about a regulatory program has always been too much for OMB 
to bear. Thus, in previous reports which (unlike this year’s report) reviewed 
regulations issued prior to 1992, OMB included estimates from EPA’s Clean 
Air Act report but assiduously surrounded these estimates with skeptical 
arguments about why the report likely overestimated the benefits of cleaning 
the air. One of the most prominent of these arguments was that the health 
risks from breathing polluted air were much higher than the workplace risks 
analyzed in the studies upon which the value of a statistical life used in 
EPA’s report was based.  OMB thought it unlikely that people exposed to 
the high risks from polluted air would be able to pay as much to avoid those 
risks because the amount they would have to pay would represent an 
appreciable portion of the average income. (OMB, Report to Congress on 
the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, at 32 (1998).) Thus, 
perversely, OMB would give a lower value to more serious risks. In its 
proposed cost-benefit guidelines, OMB appears to entrench this strange 
approach by forbidding benefits transfer in the situation described here. 
 
In instructing agencies how to translate lives into dollars, OMB also 
appears to lean heavily in favor of evidence based on a “willingness to pay” 
(WTP) framework rather than a “willingness to accept” (WTA) framework. 
The difference is that in the first case, the “consumer” of risk must pay to 
avoid it, while in the latter case, she is given the ability to decide whether to 
participate in the market for risk at all. Empirical evidence documents that 
when people are given the freedom to decline to participate in markets for 
risk, they often do so. OMB asserts, without elaboration, that WTP is 
superior because it “provide[s] a more conservative measure of benefits.” 
(Draft 2003 Report, at 5518.)  While it may be true that WTP yields lower 
estimates of regulatory benefits (because WTP is so heavily limited by a 
person’s capacity to pay), this does not mean that the estimates it yields are 
therefore more “conservative” or even more reliable.  
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Indeed, the great irony is that the most commonly used studies of 
“willingness to pay” in matters of risk are, in fact, studies of “willingness to 
accept” money in exchange for increased risk: they are studies of the wage 
premium workers in the 1970s purportedly received in return for taking on 
increased risk in the workplace. Yet OMB suggests that the values derived 
from these studies are, if anything, too low. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5519.)  
Nowhere does OMB come to terms with this internal consistency in its 
report. 
 
In discussing monetization of lives, OMB also asks agencies to 
provide monetary estimates of both lives and life-years. (Draft 2003 Report, 
at 5521.) As OMB acknowledges, providing estimates of the monetary value 
of life-years implies that there may be a difference in the monetary value of 
lives depending on the age of the people being saved. (Draft 2003 Report, at 
5521.) OMB also hedges on this point, however, suggesting that perhaps the 
elderly place a high value on reducing risks to themselves, after all. (Draft 
2003 Report, at 5521.)  
 
In analyses conducted in less public settings, however, OMB has not 
been so reticent about the relative value of the old and the young. In several 
analyses of the benefits of air pollution regulation, for example, OMB has 
insisted upon including different monetary values for people whose lives are 
saved by this regulation, depending on whether they are under or over 70 at 
the time they are saved. (See, e.g., 
http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_adden.pdf (valuing lives of people 
under 70 at $3.7 million, and lives of people over 70 at $2.3 million).) 
 
Finally, OMB does not instruct agencies how they might adjust 
monetary values for life and health upward in situations where the lives and 
health are protected from future harm.  Although, as discussed in the next 
section, OMB spends a great deal of time justifying its decision to require 
agencies to discount future benefits, OMB does not tell agencies to increase 
future benefits to account for the income growth that OMB itself expects to 
occur in the future. 
 
E.  Discounting 
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OMB’s proposed guidelines also further entrench another problematic 
analytical technique – the technique of discounting future regulatory 
benefits, including lives saved. 
 
As a general matter, the use of discounting systematically and 
improperly downgrades the importance of environmental regulation. While 
discounting makes sense in comparing alternative financial investments, it 
cannot reasonably be used to make a choice between preventing harms to 
present generations and preventing similar harms to future generations. Nor 
can discounting reasonably be used even to make a choice between harms to 
the current generation; choosing between preventing an automobile fatality 
and a cancer death does not turn on prevailing rates of return on financial 
investments.  In addition, discounting tends to trivialize long-term 
environmental risks, minimizing the very real threat our society faces from 
potential catastrophes and irreversible environmental harms, such as those 
posed by global warming and nuclear waste. 
 
 OMB’s proposed guidelines add two new features to this problematic 
exercise.  First, OMB asks agencies to consider “the time lag between when 
a rule takes effect and when the resulting physical improvements in health 
status will be observed in the target population” – a time period it calls the 
“cessation lag.”  (Draft 2003 Report, at 5522.)  This new analytical 
requirement is burdensome without being helpful. OMB cannot even tell us 
whether the “cessation lag” is different from the latency period for human 
disease.  (Draft 2003 Report, at 5522.) This requirement threatens to waste 
agency resources without providing any meaningful information about 
regulatory policy. As with many of OMB’s analytical requirements, 
however, the concept of a cessation lag does have the “benefit,” when 
employed, of reducing the apparent benefits of health, safety, and 
environmental protection. 
 
 Second, OMB includes in its proposed guidelines a discussion of 
discounting regulatory benefits to future generations. Despite the unstable 
methodological foundations of such a practice (no one suggests we can ask 
the yet-to-be-born what their willingness to pay for reduced risk is), and 
despite the ethical problems associated with discounting the well-being of 
future generations, OMB forges ahead with this practice. OMB blithely 
explains that since future generations are likely to be wealthier than we are, 
discounting is appropriate. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5522.) Nowhere does 
OMB come to terms with the fact that if future generations are indeed 
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wealthier than we are, they will likely be willing to pay more to reduce risk 
than we are, and thus it is not at all clear that their lives should be discounted 
relative to ours.  Nor does OMB acknowledge the possibility that large-scale 
social, political, and environmental upheavals could lead to greater, rather 
than less, poverty in future generations.  
 
 OMB does try to justify discounting the utility of future generations 
by saying that great uncertainty exists with respect to the appropriate 
discount rate over very long time intervals – but OMB acknowledges, at the 
same time, that this justification merely supports the lowering of the 
discount rate applied to benefits accruing to future generations. (Draft 2003 
Report, at 5523.) It does not support the use of discounting in the first place, 
in the context of future generations. So the only argument we are left with 
for discounting benefits accruing to future generations is that they are likely 
to be richer than we are. 
 
 It is hard to overstate the effect of discounting on benefits that will 
accrue to future generations.  In the year 2100, the Census Bureau predicts, 
the population of the United States will be approximately 571 million 
people.  At OMB’s 7 percent discount rate, saving the entire population of 
the United States one century from now becomes equivalent, in cost-benefit 
terms, to saving about 658,000 people today. With the magic of a calculator, 
over 570 million lives simply disappear. 
 
II. OMB’s Estimates of the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation 
 
 The aggregate estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation 
in the Draft 2003 Report are so pervaded by biases, and so riddled by error, 
that they are virtually worthless as an indicator of the general wisdom of 
current approaches to federal regulation.  These biases and errors surface in 
OMB’s estimates of costs and benefits; in OMB’s decisions about what 
types of federal programs to exclude from cost-benefit review; in OMB’s 
choices about which federal regulations to exclude from its cost-benefit 
tables; and in OMB’s commentary on these estimates.  Finally, the tables 
presenting OMB’s estimates are so confusing as to be almost indecipherable 
to anyone not willing to devote many hours to decoding them; even then 
they are hard to fathom. 
 
A.  OMB’s Underestimation of Regulatory Benefits 
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 OMB uses a myriad of approaches to make regulatory benefits look as 
minuscule as possible.  I will rest with one important example. OMB goes 
out of its way to present alternative estimates of the costs and benefits of 
three rules issued between October 2001 and September 2002. (Draft 2003 
Report, at 5501, Table 8.)  Included in this analysis is EPA’s rule controlling 
emissions from large nonroad engines. Whereas OMB first reports that this 
rule will produce $410 million per year in reduced engine operating costs 
and $900 million to $7.88 billion in air quality benefits in the year 2030 
(Draft 2003 Report, at 5496, Table 4), OMB later opines that the rule will 
produce from $913 million to $4.8 billion in annual benefits.  (Draft 2003 
Report, at 5501, Table 8.)  What accounts for the difference in these two 
estimates? 
 
 At the high end, it is simply not clear how OMB has managed to 
reduce annual benefits so dramatically.  That is all I can say. 
 
 At the lower end, however, it is all too clear (if one reads deeply 
enough into documents outside OMB’s report). OMB managed to estimate 
that the benefits of the nonroad engine rule could be as “low” as $913 
million per year only through a bizarre and implausible analytical technique 
whose only justification, so far as I can tell, is to make regulatory benefits 
appear smaller than they are.  This strained methodology is noteworthy 
because it tackles air pollution control, an area of environmental protection 
where health benefits are both clear and widespread. 
 
 OMB’s strange new analytical technique (which appears in this Draft 
Report, in the economic analysis of the administration’s Clear Skies 
initiative, and in the economic analysis of the nonroad engine rule) begins 
with four steps.  First, reduce the value of statistical life by considering only 
“contingent valuation” studies (surveys), not studies of actual market 
behavior (in contradiction of OMB’s preference, expressed elsewhere, for 
the latter over the former).  Second, assign a lower monetary value to the 
lives of the elderly than to those of younger people.  Third, by looking at 
average life expectancy, determine the number of life-years remaining to 
these two populations.  Fourth, divide the monetary value you have used by 
the number of remaining life-years.  These calculations will produce an 
estimate of the monetary value per life-year saved for elderly and younger 
populations, respectively. Oddly enough, despite the initial assumption that 
the lives of the elderly are worth less in monetary terms, this strange 
calculation has the effect of making them worth more in the end: because 
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they have fewer life-years left to live, each life-year is worth relatively more 
when the value of life is fixed in advance.  (OMB has not yet come to terms 
with the internal inconsistency of this new approach.) 
 
 After these calculations, assume that air pollution regulation saves 
five years of life, no matter how old the person who is saved is. Next, 
multiply the number of life-years saved (five) by the monetary value you 
have calculated for a life-year in the relevant population. Now, you once 
again have arrived at a monetary value for a statistical life: but the beauty of 
this approach is that this value has magically shrunk through the strange 
calculations described above.  (To see this bizarre analysis in action, see, for 
example, EPA’s cost-benefit analysis of the “Clear Skies” initiative, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_adden.pdf, at pp. 35-37.) 
 
 What is the theoretical or empirical justification for this strange new 
methodology, beyond its capacity to shrink regulatory benefits? OMB does 
not say. 
 
B.  OMB’s Arbitrary Exclusion of Deregulatory Actions from Cost-
Benefit Review 
 
 One looks in vain in this year’s draft report for any evidence of some 
of the most high-profile agency activities of the past two years: that is, 
actions taken to reduce regulatory requirements for private industry. It is as 
if EPA had not, for example, changed the New Source Review program of 
the Clean Air Act.  By subjecting regulatory actions to cost-benefit review, 
but allowing deregulatory actions a free pass, OMB exhibits its clear bias 
toward deregulation and against government intervention. 
 
C. OMB’s Arbitrary Exclusion of So-Called “Agency Transfer Rules” 
from Cost-Benefit Review 
 
 The Draft 2003 Report does not report the costs and benefits of what 
it calls “agency transfer rules,” or rules that transfer money from the federal 
government to private parties.  Indeed, the Report does not even list such 
rules if they were issued prior to October 1, 2001; it lists such rules only if 
they were issued subsequent to that date.  (Draft 2003 Report at p. 5497, 
Table 5.)  For the “agency transfer rules” issued between October 1, 2001, 
and September 30, 2002, OMB provides only a brief description of the rules 
without any estimate whatsoever of their economic costs or benefits.  In its 
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2002 Report to Congress, “Stimulating Smarter Regulation: 2002 Report to 
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates 
on State, Local, and Tribal Entities” [hereinafter “Stimulating Smarter 
Regulation”], OMB explained in a footnote why it had not analyzed the 
costs and benefits of transfer rules: “Rules that transfer Federal dollars 
among parties are not included because transfers are not social costs or 
benefits.  If included, they would add equal amounts to benefits and costs.”  
(OMB Final 2002 Report, at p. 36 n. 30.) 
 
 The “transfer rules” listed in the Draft 2003 Report include many very 
expensive government programs.  The money spent on these programs is not 
available for other purposes. The expenditures associated with these 
programs are therefore opportunity costs in the classic sense; if, for example, 
the federal government were not going to spend an estimated $1.3 billion to 
pay peanut farmers to buy out their government quotas (see fourth item on 
Table 5, Draft 2003 Report at 5497; for cost estimate, see 
http://www.ewg.org/farm/peanuts/faq_peanuts.php, citing Congressional 
Budget Office estimate of program costs), it would presumably have that 
$1.3 billion to spend on something else.  Elsewhere in the Draft 2003 
Report, OMB states that one of its purposes in conducting cost-benefit 
analysis is to assess the opportunity costs of federal government programs. 
(Draft 2003 Report, at 5518.)  In addition, in its proposed new guidelines for 
cost-benefit analysis, OMB explicitly requires agencies to the distributional 
effects of transfer payments.  (Draft 2003 Report, at 5524.) OMB’s complete 
and utter failure to consider the opportunity costs and distributional 
consequences of the “agency transfer rules” in Table 5 flouts OMB’s own 
official policy statements. 
 
 Furthermore, OMB has provided no principled definition of what 
constitutes a “transfer rule.”  Technically speaking, the transfer rules that lie 
outside the scope of conventional cost-benefit analysis are those rules that do 
not attempt to change, or have the effect of changing, the nature or level of 
economic goods or services provided by private economic actors.  They 
simply transfer money from one entity to another after market actors have 
chosen the nature and level of goods and services to be provided.   
 
 The agency rules OMB includes within the category of “transfer 
rules” do not all meet this definition. For example, OMB includes as 
“transfer rules” agricultural subsidy programs that clearly affect the nature 
and level of agricultural goods provided in this country. There can be little 
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doubt, for example, that the agency rules associated with the 2002 farm 
bill’s sugar program (listed in Table 5, 2003 Draft Report, at 5497) will 
affect the production of sugar and thus affect the primary behavior of market 
actors. Yet OMB provides no explanation as to why these rules are “transfer 
rules” rather than rules that would otherwise be subject to economic 
analysis.  If the federal government chose to affect sugar production through 
more conventional regulation – such as, for example, the tightening of 
environmental standards for sugar production – then the costs associated 
with that regulation would appear in OMB’s cost-benefit tables.  It is purely 
arbitrary to characterize rules such as the sugar program rules as “transfer 
rules” simply because they affect market actors’ behavior through subsidies 
rather than through government commands. 
 
 Even more fundamentally, OMB’s decision not to examine the costs 
and benefits of transfer rules exposes the general poverty of OMB’s 
analytical methodologies.  Transfer programs – especially those in which the 
government takes money from general revenues and gives it to a specific 
person or entity – are filled with potential for waste and special-interest deal-
making. They offer an opportunity, moreover, for the rich to get richer at the 
taxpayer’s expense.  In the Peanut Quota Buyout Program, for example, it is 
estimated that the largest peanut farmers will get the most money from the 
program. (For information about the program, see 
http://www.ewg.org/farm/peanuts.) Even if this were indeed a true transfer 
program – one which had no effect on the market behavior of peanut farmers 
– it should nevertheless be relevant, as a matter of public policy, that money 
is being transferred from the relatively worse off (consider the average 
taxpayer) to the relatively better off (the biggest peanut farmers get the most 
money).  OMB’s muteness in the face of this transfer reflects the general 
inability of cost-benefit analysis to take the distributional effects of 
government programs into account in adjudging their wisdom.  Even so, to 
have OMB wash its hands of review of this kind of program, which in this 
case is predicted to cost taxpayers $1.3 billion, and to turn its steely gaze 
instead on air pollution rules that seem to be the best regulatory bargain of 
all, reflects a massive failure of OMB to set sensible priorities for its own 
oversight activities. 
 
 Perhaps OMB will respond by suggesting that it has no authority to 
question the priorities reflected in, for example, agricultural subsidies that go 
predominantly to the richest farmers.  Here, it suffices to observe that OMB 
has displayed no such reticence when it comes to questioning the priorities 
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embodied in health, safety, and environmental legislation (a topic to which 
we will return in Part II, below). 
 
 At the very least, OMB should provide: (1) a clear definition of what 
it means by “agency transfer rules”; (2) an explanation of why the rules 
listed in Table 5 meet this definition; (3) a listing of the economic costs of 
the transfer rules it deems inappropriate for cost-benefit analysis, so that the 
reader of this Report might at least be able to judge the relative expense 
associated with the transfer rules OMB does not choose to analyze and the 
social regulations it does; and (4) as required by its own proposed cost-
benefit guidance, an analysis of the distributional effects of these transfer 
rules. 
 
D. OMB’s Arbitrary Exclusion of Highly Efficacious Rules from its 
Estimates of the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations 
 
  Even where information about a rule’s costs and benefits is available, 
OMB sometimes arbitrarily excludes this information from its estimates of 
the costs and benefits of federal regulation. These exclusions, though 
arbitrary, do serve one (illegitimate) purpose: because the rules excluded 
were highly efficacious, their exclusion from OMB’s aggregate estimates of 
the costs and benefits of federal regulation makes those aggregate estimates 
look less favorable to regulation than they would with these programs 
included. 
 
 First, OMB excludes three air pollution rules – which it refers to as 
“mobile source” rules even though only one of the rules has to do with 
mobile sources – from its estimates.  (Draft 2003 Report, at p. 28.)  
Although OMB concedes that these rules are “projected to achieve 
substantial reductions in [sulfur dioxide] and [particulate matter] emissions,” 
OMB nonetheless leaves these rules out of its analysis due to “the 
uncertainties associated with benefits transfer.”  (Draft 2003 Report, at 5502, 
& n. 14.)  This is an amazing statement.  Virtually all of the monetized 
benefits of health, safety, and environmental rules – insofar as these benefits 
include reduction in risk of death – involve “uncertainties associated with 
benefits transfer.” Benefits transfer is simply the practice of using monetary 
valuations obtained in one context – such as risks in the workplace – to 
value benefits in another context – such as environmental risks.  OMB’s 
observation that these uncertainties also arise from differences in “sources of 
emissions, meteorology,” etc. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5502), also would 
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apply to any attempt to value pollution reduction according to the value per 
ton of pollution reduced.  OMB makes no effort whatsoever to explain why 
these three rules, in particular, pose the problem of uncertainty to such a 
degree that they should not be included in its analysis. 
 
Second, OMB also excludes analysis of the costs and benefits of other 
rules, but without mentioning it.  For example, OMB does not discuss the 
costs and benefits of OSHA’s ergonomics standard and the FDA’s 
regulation of tobacco and tobacco products.  In last year’s report, OMB 
explained that it was excluding these rules because they had been overturned 
– in the former case by Congress, in the latter by the Supreme Court.  
(Stimulating Smarter Regulation, at 37, n. 32.) Yet OMB has in the past 
included rules subject to legal challenge in its analysis.  (Stimulating 
Smarter Regulation, at 50, Table 9 (listing costs and benefits of roadless area 
conservation rule); id. at 104 (noting that the implementation of this rule had 
been enjoined by a federal district court).)  One would think it would be 
useful for OMB to consider whether any of the rules that have been 
invalidated – either by Congress or the courts – were sensible enough to 
justify inquiry into whether they could be resurrected in some form.  In 
particular, since this is a report to Congress on the costs and benefits of 
federal regulation, it seems reasonable to expect OMB to advise Congress as 
to how the one rule that Congress has invalidated under the Congressional 
Review Act – OSHA’s ergonomics standard – would fare under OMB’s 
current standards for cost-benefit analysis. For its part, OSHA thought the 
ergonomics rule would produce at least $9 billion in annualized benefits.  
(See GAO letter to Senator Jeffords, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/majrule/d01200r.htm (11/29/00).) 
 
 It appears that OMB has also excluded other major rules from this 
year’s analysis, without saying so.  For example, last year, OMB excluded 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) revised National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate matter from its 
analysis on the ground that it thought this would prevent “double-counting.” 
(Stimulating Smarter Regulation, p. 37, n. 32.)  Yet this year, OMB says that 
its estimates of the costs and benefits of major rules for the period come 
from Chapter IV of OMB’s 2000 Report. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5499.)  The 
2000 Report included estimates of the costs and benefits of the revised 
ozone and particulate matter NAAQS.  It does not appear, however, that 
OMB included these estimates in this year’s draft report, as the numbers for 
EPA in the draft report would be much higher – and show air pollution 
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regulation in an even more favorable light – if the NAAQS were included. If 
OMB decides to include the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS from its 
estimates in order to prevent “double-counting” of costs and benefits, OMB 
should explain how it has concluded that attaining and maintaining the 
revised NAAQS will involve only those air pollution control programs it has 
listed in its Draft 2003 Report.  
 
 In sum, OMB has arbitrarily excluded rules from its estimates of costs 
and benefits – and has done so in a manner that appears systematically to 
paint regulation in a less favorable light than if those rules were included. 
 
E. OMB’s Grudging Attitude Toward Finding Benefits From 
Environmental Regulation 
 
 If one merely looked at the tables in OMB’s report, one would expect 
OMB to conclude that the best regulatory bargain around is regulation of air 
pollution.  Time and again, OMB’s numbers reflect how large the benefits of 
air pollution regulation are in comparison to its costs. Yet, instead of 
praising this kind of regulation from an economic point of view, OMB does 
all it can to minimize the impression that regulating air pollution has 
produced overwhelmingly positive results.  For one thing, as noted above, 
OMB arbitrarily excludes effective pollution regulations from its analysis. In 
addition, in two different places, OMB goes out of its way to express its 
skepticism about the benefits of air pollution control.  (Draft 2003 Report, at 
5494, n. 8; 5502, n. 12.) 
 
 A less skeptical, more objective, attitude toward air pollution control 
would be in order if OMB were truly interested in neutrally reviewing 
federal regulatory programs.  Such an attitude might, at the least, have led 
OMB to catch sooner its whopper of a mistake in last year’s report: as OMB 
acknowledges in this year’s draft report, it overestimated the costs of air 
pollution control by $20 billion per year in last year’s report. (Draft 2003 
Report, at 5493.)  One might perhaps be forgiven for wondering whether a 
more neutral attitude toward environmental regulation might have caused 
OMB’s analysts to question the magnitude of this number – and to discover 
the mistake it was about to make – before the 2002 report was published. 
  
F.  OMB’s Tables Are Confusing and Opaque 
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 For an office that crows about the transparency of its analysis, OMB’s 
tables showing the costs and benefits of federal regulation are surprisingly 
hard to understand, to follow, and to critique.  OMB should do a better job 
of explaining what it is doing. 
 
 First of all, OMB’s report is very hard to follow if one does not, in 
addition to reading this report, read the many OMB reports on costs and 
benefits that have preceded it.  OMB frequently refers to previous reports for 
exceedingly important points, without elaboration.  For example, as 
mentioned above, OMB refers to its 2000 Report as the source of its 
estimates of costs and benefits for the years 1995-1999, yet it appears that 
OMB has made significant adjustments to the 2000 Report’s estimates – 
without saying so or explaining why. 
 
 Second, OMB, confusingly, presents separate charts for different 
periods of time (1992-93, etc.), without ever presenting, in one place, a chart 
showing all of the regulations and cost/benefit estimates on which it is 
relying.  This haphazard mode of presentation is hard to follow, and also 
raises questions about what exactly OMB is doing. OMB should provide its 
estimates in a form that allows a reader to check its work. In this regard, it 
would help matters greatly if OMB would describe the rules it is appraising 
more precisely by, for example, giving a cite from the Federal Register to 
each rule it analyzes in this Report. 
 
 Finally, OMB places crucial reliance on two documents that do not 
appear to be in the public record.  In estimating the benefits of reducing 
emissions of nitrogen oxides from stationary and mobile sources, OMB cites 
a letter from Don Arbuckle to Tom Gibson, dated May 16, 2002, and a 
memo to EPA’s NSR docket from Bryan Hubbell of EPA.  (Draft 2003 
Report, at 5502.)  OMB relies on these documents in justifying its decision 
to value benefits of reducing the same air pollutant – nitrogen oxides – 
differently depending on whether it comes from stationary or mobile 
sources.  (Draft 2003 Report, at 5502.)  I have attempted to obtain these 
documents from the web or, in the case of the Hubbell memo, from Bryan 
Hubbell himself via an email request, but so far I have been unable to obtain 
them.  Thus, as far as I can tell, OMB’s assertions about the relative benefits 
of reducing pollution from stationary and mobile sources cannot be 
evaluated by the public.  These memos should be made public – preferably 
on OMB’s web site, so that they are easy to find when reviewing OMB’s 
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Draft Report – so that OMB’s important assumptions about the benefits of 
air pollution control can be analyzed. 
 
III.  Terrorism and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 Last year, OMB reported that it had cleared 58 new regulations in 
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. (Stimulating Smarter 
Regulation, at 7 & Table 1.)  OMB stated that many of these rules did not 
have an impact of $100 million or more on the economy and thus had not 
been accompanied by regulatory impact statements.  (Stimulating Smarter 
Regulation, at 11.)  Even so, surely some of these rules were economically 
significant – yet an analysis of their costs and benefits did not appear in last 
year’s report, nor does one appear in this year’s report.  OMB assures the 
reader that “all the rules related to September 11th received priority attention 
from the appropriate reviewers, and that the Administration’s best solutions 
to respond to potential terrorist attacks were implemented” (Draft 2003 
Report, at 5499), but it provides no specific analysis of these important rules. 
 
The result is almost surreal: whereas this year’s report gives us 
detailed analysis of rules such as the Department of the Interior’s “Early 
Season Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations 2002-2003” and its “Late-
Season Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations 2002-2003” (Draft 2003 
Report, at 5495, Table 4), it provides no analysis whatsoever of the costs and 
benefits of the large-scale regulatory changes that have taken place after 
September 11.  Looking at OMB’s draft report, one would think our country 
had spent the last year absorbed in the minutiae of the bird-hunting season. 
 
 It is not that cost-benefit analysis of terrorism-related regulation will 
be very helpful, as discussed below.  Rather, it is that OMB’s apparently 
arbitrary selection of the rules to be included in its report on the costs and 
benefits of federal regulation renders the report virtually meaningless in 
evaluating federal regulatory policy.  Attending to the costs and benefits of 
adjusting the bird-hunting season, without analyzing the effectiveness of all 
we have done after September 11, makes a mockery of OMB’s pretense of 
expertise in priority setting. 
 
 This year’s draft report does, to be sure, invite comment on how OMB 
might go about analyzing terrorism-related regulations.  (Draft 2003 Report, 
at 5499.) However, it does so by asking how best to conduct cost-benefit 
analysis of such regulations. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5499.)  It is reasonable 
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to predict that any such analysis of terrorism-related regulations is doomed 
to failure. Prevention of terrorism, like many other important social aims, is 
not capable of being incorporated into the narrow and rigid framework of 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Perhaps the best evidence for this proposition comes from an effort, 
pre-September 11, to assess the costs and benefits of improving airline 
security in order to prevent terrorist attacks. Shortly after TWA Flight 800 
crashed into the ocean off the coast of Long Island in 1996, Robert Hahn, 
now the director of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
tried to assess the costs and benefits of enhanced airport security.  (Robert 
W. Hahn, The Cost of Antiterrorist Rhetoric, Regulation: The Review of 
Business & Government, vol. 19 no. 4 (1996).) He concluded that the costs 
of improved airport security were not worth the benefits. The benefits, he 
argued, were quite small given that, at that time, only an average of 37 
people per year died in terrorist incidents. He stated that even if that number 
were increased ten-fold or even one-hundred-fold, the benefits of improved 
airport security still would not exceed the costs.  September 11, of course, 
increased the terrorist death toll for 2001 by almost one-hundred-fold from 
Hahn’s estimate. 
  
 Where upper-bound risks are radically uncertain, as they are in the 
case of terrorism (and as they often are when it comes to health, safety, and 
environmental problems), it defies reason to act as though they can be 
meaningfully absorbed into the cost-benefit framework. Perhaps the best that 
can be done is to ask, not whether measures to combat such risks pass the 
cost-benefit test, but whether the measures we have adopted are reasonably 
likely to reduce these risks. 
 
IV.  Inviting Criticism of the Precautionary Principle 
 
 In a new feature of its report, OMB invites commentators to discuss 
U.S. approaches to analyzing and managing “emerging risks.”  (Draft 2003 
Report, at 5498-99.)  Specifically, OMB asks for comment on: (1) “the ways 
in which ‘precaution’ is embedded in current risk assessment procedures 
through ‘conservative’ assumptions or through explicit ‘protective’ 
measures”; (2) examples of risk assessment approaches “which appear 
unbalanced”; and (3) “[h]ow the U.S. balances precautionary approaches to 
health, safety and environmental risks with other interests such as economic 
growth and technological innovation.” (Draft 2003 Report, at 5499.)  
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The wording of this invitation for comments suggests OMB is anxious 
to receive comments that are hostile to the principle of precaution. Other 
portions of the Draft Report reinforce this interpretation.  (See, e.g., Draft 
2003 Report, at 5523 (cautioning against incorporation of precaution in risk 
assessments).) It is too early to tell what will come of this process. Given the 
fiascos created by OMB’s previous open-ended invitations to commentators 
to submit criticisms of the current regulatory system (recall the “hit list” of 
the 2001 Report), it will be worth monitoring OMB’s response to the 
comments it has solicited on the precautionary principle. 
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